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JOINDER IS COMING: WHY DENYING SWARM JOINDER IN 
BITTORRENT CASES MAY DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD 
Gibran J. Peña-Porras* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, the seventh season of the TV show Game of Thrones1 
(“GOT”) was pirated2 1.03 billion times.3 The true magnitude of this 
number may require some context. The premiere of GOT’s seventh 
season was viewed by 16.1 million viewers,4 either on its broadcasting 
television network or through the network’s on-demand online 
platform.5 This high viewership broke records among the network’s TV 
shows as “the most-watched season premiere for any HBO series” up to 
that date.6 The quantified popularity of that particular episode translated 
ten-fold onto piracy statistics, as the episode was illegally downloaded 
or streamed more than ten times the number of viewers it had during its 
airing.7 This trend was consistent throughout the show’s season, and the 
season’s finale was pirated more than 120 million times within three 
days of its airing.8 
The illegal download of protected works is not a problem exclusive to 
television. The Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) 
estimates that in the ten years that followed the creation of the peer-to-
peer (“P2P”) file-sharing site Napster in 1999, “music sales in the U.S. 
[] dropped 47 percent, from $14.6 billion to $7.7 billion.”9 This practice 
 
 *I want to thank my family for their endless support, my mentors for their patience and 
guidance, and the University of Cincinnati Law Review for their vote of confidence. 
 1. A fantasy-drama television series adapted from George R. R. Martin’s series of novels titled 
A Song of Ice and Fire. 
 2. By “pirated” the author means illegally downloaded, distributed, copied, or streamed. This 
Article will refer to those who engage (or allegedly engage) in piracy, as “pirates.” 
 3. Travis M. Andrews, “Game of Thrones” Was Pirated More Than A Billion Times, THE 
WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/09/08/game-of-thrones-was-pirated-more-than-a-billion-times-far-more-than-it-was-
watched-legally/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.fbc9b81a951c [https://perma.cc/6WXY-43D9]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. The show is broadcasted through HBO’s network and is also available through HBO’s 
streaming platforms “HBO Go” and “HBO Now.” 
 6. Joe Otterson, “Game of Thrones” Season 7 Premiere Shatters HBO Rating Records, 
VARIETY (July 17, 2017, 1:04 PM), http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/game-of-thrones-season-7-
premiere-ratings-1202497751/ [https://perma.cc/F97F-A36R]. 
 7. Andrews, supra note 3 (The premiere of the season was downloaded 187.4 million times). 
 8. Id. 
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has also been a hard hit to the “big screen.”10 A study in 2016, estimates 
that a $1.3 billion loss of potential box-office revenue every year can be 
attributed to piracy.11 
Evidently, these piracy statistics and their impact on the entertainment 
industry are the symptom of a much larger problem. Copyrighted works 
of music, films, TV shows, books, magazines, and software applications 
are currently being downloaded and uploaded through P2P protocols by 
the thousands, as the global file-sharing12 traffic in 201813 is expected to 
be around 6,717 petabytes.14 Despite the high number of protected 
materials being shared (through file-sharing), the creators do not realize 
the benefit of this vast consumption of their works. The damage done to 
the authors of these protected works is one of opportunity cost. 
Consumption of their works increases while revenue becomes 
stagnant—effectively decreasing the value of the work. Nonetheless, 
this loss is akin to proving a negative: how can the author be hurt by the 
free distribution of a protected work if the author never had possession 
of the benefit of selling the work? Some commentators—those that are 
willing to admit that piracy does some damage—go as far as stating that 
the copyright holder’s actual loss to piracy is not that bad.15 Efforts to 
eradicate the piracy problem have yielded little to no results—as actions 
against piracy-supporting websites are met with the sprouting of newer 
websites that replace those that get taken down—entangling copyright 
holders and governmental agencies in a never-ending proverbial game 
of “whack-a-mole” with pirates.16 Nevertheless, copyright holders are 
 
 10. A term utilized to refer to the cinema industry. 
 11. Liye Ma et al., The Dual Impact of Movie Piracy on Box-Office Revenue: Cannibalization 
and Promotion, CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV. TEPPER SCH. OF BUS. AND HEINZ COLL. 2 (Feb. 2016), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2736946 [https://perma.cc/ND2N-QZZK] (“Specifically, our estimates 
suggest that box-office revenue would be $1.3b (15%) higher per year if piracy could be eliminated 
entirely from the theatrical window and that piracy is particularly damaging to early sales.”). 
 12. File-sharing is the practice of share electronic files between computers. File-sharing has 
become the sought-out method of sharing files, whether protected or otherwise, across the internet. For 
more information on how file-sharing works, see Mitchell, infra note 18. 
 13. See Cisco Systems, Data Volume of Global Consumer File Sharing Traffic from 2016 Until 
2021 (in Petabytes per Month), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/267182/forecast-for-
global-internet-traffic-through-file-sharing/ [https://perma.cc/J9WD-KJRZ] (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
 14. See Tim Fisher, Terabytes, Gigabytes, & Petabytes: How Big are They?, LIFEWIRE.COM 
(Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.lifewire.com/terabytes-gigabytes-amp-petabytes-how-big-are-they-
4125169 [https://perma.cc/34MS-49JG] (A petabyte is a unit of measurement for data. One petabyte is 
equal to one million gigabytes). 
 15. Ernesto Van der Sar, Music Piracy Not That Bad, Industry Says, TORRENTFREAK.COM (Jan. 
18, 2009), https://torrentfreak.com/music-piracy-not-that-bad-industry-says-090118/ 
[https://perma.cc/V25F-DV2Q] (The argument of the article’s author is based on statements made by 
some industry players who have admitted that not every pirated song is a lost sale). 
 16. Timothy Geigner, The Crackdown on Torrent Sites Has Produced Many More Moles to 
Whac, TECHDIRT.COM (Sept. 8, 2017, 11:51 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170907/10263638165/crackdown-torrent-sites-has-produced-many-
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not ready to throw in the towel in the fight for the protection of their 
rights. 
As of late, and with the adoption of the BitTorrent protocol,17 some 
copyright holders have hit a brick wall when attempting to get 
restitution from defendants who infringe via P2P file-sharing.18 The 
collective haul of defendants into court—commonly referred to as a 
“swarm joinder”19—has created a split at the federal district court level. 
Courts have disagreed over whether copyright holders should be able to 
join defendants in swarm joinder fashion or have their complaints 
severed, forcing copyright holders to go after each defendant 
individually. The crux of this split rests largely on the district courts’ 
interpretation of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(“FRCP”). At the time of the writing of this Article, only one circuit 
court—the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit—has pitched in 
on the discussion, finding swarm joinders to not satisfy the requirements 
for permissive joinder under FRCP 20. Several pieces of scholarly 
writing can be found weighing in on the discussion as well, with the 
majority siding with the courts rejecting swarm joinder.20 
This Article respectfully disagrees with the district courts whose 
decisions purport to align with the D.C. Circuit’s decision, insofar as 
they misapply the Circuit’s precedent and instead use denial of swarm 
joinder as a tool to preemptively punish “trolls.”21 Instead, this Article 
 
more-moles-to-whac.shtml [https://perma.cc/5UQB-DJV7]. 
 17. The BitTorrent protocol is a decentralized method of peer-to-peer communication that allows 
users to transfer data between each other’s computers. The Author explains how the protocol works later 
in this Article. 
 18. Bradley Mitchell, Understanding P2P File Sharing, LIFEWIRE.COM (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://www.lifewire.com/definition-of-p2p-818026 [https://perma.cc/KYU8-JHP6] (explaining that 
P2P (or peer-to-peer) file sharing refers to the “distribution of digital media over a [decentralized] 
network, in which the files are located on individuals’ computer[s] and shared with other members of 
the network”). 
 19. See ME2 Prods. v. Bayu, 2017 WL 5165487 at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 7, 2017) (The nature of the 
BitTorrent Protocol where users are able “to join ‘swarms’ [which are] cluster[s] of connected 
computers where[] users can simultaneously upload to and download from other users”). 
 20. See Joshua M. Dickman, Anonymity and the Demands of Civil Procedure in Music 
Downloading Lawsuits, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1049 (2008) (claiming that John Doe lawsuits should not allow 
permissive joinder because it encroaches on the First Amendment); see also Joshua A. Druckerman, The 
Uncertifiable Swarm: Why Defendant Class Actions and Mass BitTorrent Copyright Litigation Don’t 
Mix, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 931 (2013/2014) (arguing that swarm joinder claims are inherently flawed 
because they raise fairness and due process concerns); but see John C. Heinbockel, The Undiscovered 
Country: Fixing Copyright by Rethinking Pretrial Litigation, 5 AM. UNIV. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 152 
(2014) (suggesting that swarm joinder can realistically meet the requirements of FRCP 20 and be useful 
in deterring infringers but with the use of special masters to assist the judges in determination of 
whether claims have merit). 
 21. See generally Jonathan Bailey, What Is a Copyright Troll?, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Apr. 12, 
2018), https://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2018/04/12/what-is-a-copyright-troll/ [https://perma.cc/M8T9-
HRZJ] (defining a copyright troll as someone who, while not really interested in exercising copyright 
protection rights, uses excessive and aggressive litigation tactics as a source of profit). 
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proposes that the courts should allow copyright holders to continue 
subpoenaing defendants in swarm joinders—at least through the early 
stage of the proceedings—and shift the focus of the debate to ways in 
which to prevent the misuse of the defendants’ identification 
information obtained as a result of these subpoenas. Part II offers the 
reader a background, for context, on the main issues contemplated in 
this Article, including a brief primer on Copyright and FRCP 20 as well 
as P2P file-sharing and its evolution with the BitTorrent Protocol. Part 
III takes a look at some of the earlier case law that deals with swarm 
joinders and the road leading up to the D.C. Circuit’s decision. Part IV 
summarizes the decisions issued after the D.C. Circuit weighed in, all 
the way up to the Cell Film Holdings LLC v. McCray22 decision by the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. Lastly, Part V offers a 
more detailed discussion of the most common arguments against 
allowing swarm joinders. Part V also presents some legal and policy 
arguments that support a change in the current course of swarm joinder 
cases, in favor of allowing the use of swarm joinder.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Advances in technology have made possible the easy download of 
copyrighted work to personal computers, and with it, a class of cases 
referred to as “BitTorrent” cases arose.23 This Part will outline the 
relevant information of all the moving pieces in BitTorrent cases, from a 
primer on the Copyright statute, FRCP 20 and 21, and the two main file-
sharing protocols: client-server and peer-to-peer. 
A. The Copyright Statute and What It Protects 
Article I Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution of the United States 
provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”24 This clause, known as the copyright clause,25 is the 
foundation upon which Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. §102.26 
The statute protects works that are fixed in tangible mediums of 
expression including several categories of works such as books and 
novels, melodies and songs, plays and operas, pictures and sculptures, 
 
 22. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624 * 
 23. See generally On the Cheap, LLC v. Does 1-5011, 280 F.R.D. 500 (N. Dist. Cal. 2011). 
 24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 25. See 1 Nimmer on Copyright § 1.02 (2017). 
 26. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
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movies and other videos, sound recordings, and works of architecture.27 
Piracy has reached almost all of these categories in one way or another: 
books, novels, songs, scripts, pictures, movies, videos, and sound 
recordings can all be found on pirate websites, available for illegal 
download, in addition to other protected works such as software and 
video games.28 
However, not every work that falls within these categories enjoys 
copyright protection; there are requirements and caveats to the process. 
First, §102(a) has an originality requirement that is fairly easy to meet.29 
In order for a work to be considered original under the statute, the work 
needs to (1) be the work of its author and not a copy, and (2) possess 
some minimal degree of creativity.30 
The other requirement under §102 is that the original work must be 
“fixed in tangible medium[s] of expression.”31 The definition of a 
“tangible medium” is an important one, because a literal interpretation 
would leave outside of the statute’s scope those materials reproduced 
electronically.32 Although one cannot necessarily touch the code of a 
software program, its existence in a hard drive or Compact Disc makes 
it so that it is “sufficiently permanent or stable” to be “perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and that provides it with 
copyright protection.33 
Lastly, copyright protection is only available to the “expression of 
[an] idea” and thus, does not extend to facts or to the idea itself.34 In 
summary, an author that has an original work fixated in a tangible 
medium is able to obtain protection of the expression in the work, but 
not on the idea expressed. 
Once protection has been obtained, the copyright holder owns the 
exclusive rights to create or authorize the reproduction, derivation, 
distribution, performance, display, and transmission of the protected 
work.35 However, copyright protection is not absolute, and 17 U.S.C. 
§107 provides that, if the work is used in activities that constitute fair 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. For an example of the categories available for download see The Pirate Bay website at 
https://thepiratebay.org/browse [https://perma.cc/S5PQ-B8WJ] (last visited on Aug. 25, 2018). 
 29. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358, (1991) (“[T]he originality 
requirement is not particularly stringent”). 
 30. Id. at 345. 
 31. 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
 32. Some examples would include a song reproduced from a computer instead of a physical CD, 
a movie played in an electronic device instead of through a DVD, or a piece of software running in a 
computer instead of from an installation disk. 
 33. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
 34. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 433 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 35. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
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use, the copyright holder cannot sue the user, even if the copyright 
holder did not grant any license or permission to use the work.36 If the 
use does not meet the requirements to constitute fair use, the copyright 
is considered infringed and the copyright holder may file a claim for 
copyright infringement against the user.37 The remedies available to the 
copyright holder under the statute include injunctions to prevent or 
restrain the infringement of the copyright,38 impounding of the 
infringing works or materials,39 actual damages suffered and the 
copyright holder’s profits lost because of the infringement or statutory 
damages,40 and costs of court and attorney fees.41 Additionally, under 
some specific circumstances, infringers may find themselves subject to 
criminal charges for infringement.42 
In order to find out if their material is being downloaded illegally, 
copyright holders often make use of the same tools that pirates use to 
obtain protected works.43 Copyright holders search the name of their 
work and, just like any other user, can see the trackers generated through 
the BitTorrent client.44 Because the tracker only identifies participants of 
the swarm through IP addresses,45 once the copyright holders have 
confirmed the illegal download of their work, they often proceed to file 
a nameless lawsuit to acquire the identity of the IP addresses’ owners 
and to properly name them as defendants.46 
B. John Doe Lawsuits and Obtaining the Defendant’s Identity 
Claims against defendants engaged in online piracy are known as 
 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (The criteria to determine whether a use qualifies as fair use under the 
statute includes: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount 
and substantiality of the original work that is used, and the effect on the market for the original work). 
 37. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 38. See 17 U.S.C. § 502. 
 39. Id. at § 503. 
 40. Id. at § 504(a). 
 41. Id. at § 505. 
 42. Id. at § 506. 
 43. See How Can a Copyright Holder Find Out If I Have Copyrighted Materials on My 
Computer? HARV. UNIV. DCMA https://dmca.harvard.edu/faq/how-can-copyright-holder-find-out-if-i-
have-copyrighted-materials-my-computer [https://perma.cc/ZL57-JHSE] (last visited Aug. 25, 2018). 
 44. See Bradley Mitchell, What Is a Bit Torrent Tracker?, LIFEWIRE.COM (Jan. 3, 2018), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-bit-torrent-tracker-817431 [https://perma.cc/9G96-37UJ]. 
 45. See Chris Hoffman, How Does BitTorrent Work?, HOW-TO GEEK (Sept. 21, 2016), 
https://www.howtogeek.com/141257/htg-explains-how-does-bittorrent-work/ [https://perma.cc/Z2YR-
48AZ]. 
 46. See Cell Film Holdings LLC v. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *5 (D. Nev. 
Nov. 29, 2017) (“Because the defendants are initially unidentified, the plaintiff [has to] file[] an ex parte 
motion [to obtain] the names and addresses” of the defendants). 
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“John Doe” lawsuits.47 A typical John Doe claim generally follows a 
standard set of steps. First, the copyright holders file a claim in federal 
court against nameless defendants that are generally only identified and 
differentiated by their IP address.48 The copyright holders then file a 
motion requesting the court to waive the discovery requirements set 
forth in Rule 2649 of the FRCP and allow the copyright holders to 
subpoena the defendants’ Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) for the 
defendants’ identifying information50 pursuant to FRCP 45.51 If the 
court grants the motion, the court will subpoena the ISPs for this 
information, while allowing the ISPs to notify the defendants about the 
request for their information. This gives defendants a chance to protest 
the release of their information and contest the subpoena in general.52 In 
most of the cases, there is at least one defendant who objects to the 
release of the information by raising jurisdiction and joinder issues. 
Therefore, once the court receives the defendants’ answers, it 
determines whether the copyright holders’ claims should be allowed to 
proceed as filed or whether they should be severed to address any 
jurisdiction or joinder issues.53 
C. Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Permissive Joinder 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow plaintiffs and defendants 
to be joined in judicial actions, provided that the parties to be joined are 
able to meet certain requirements. Because the first provision of FRCP 
20(a)(1) deals with the joinder of plaintiffs,54 this Article will not 
address that particular provision. Instead, this Article will focus its 
 
 47. See generally Id. 
 48. See Tim Fisher, What Is an IP Address?, LIFEWIRE.COM (Apr. 23, 2018), 
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-an-ip-address-2625920 [https://perma.cc/DE6J-A9GK] (An IP 
address is “an identifying number for a piece of network hardware [that] allows a device to 
communicate with other devices over an IP-based network like the internet”). 
 49. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (2015) (Section 26(d) states that discovery may not be sought until the 
parties have had a discovery conference as provided by Rule 26(f). The provision also provides for the 
timing with which discovery has to be provided; Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (2015) (Section 26(f) provides for 
the steps and requirements needed to plan and execute discovery). 
 50. See generally Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332, 340 
(D.D.C. 2011) (discussing how other districts have granted motions to subpoena ISPs to compel 
production of identifying information of defendants, such as names, addresses, emails, and phone 
numbers of the defendants). 
 51. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 45. 
 52. See generally Robert G. Larson & Paul A. Godfread, Contemporary Issues in Cyberlaw: 
Bringing John Doe to Court, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 328, 339 (Larson and Godfread provide a brief 
summary of the steps through which a John Doe claim goes from the filing of the suit through the 
defendants’ opposition to the disclosure of their information). 
 53. See ME2 Prods., 2017 WL 5165487 *8. 
 54. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1). 
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analysis of the Rule on provisions 20(a)(2)-(3) and 20(b). 
Provision 20(a)(2) establishes that a party “may be joined in one 
action as [a] defendant[] if” the party meets both of the provision’s 
requirements, which are (1) transactional relationship and (2) 
commonality.55 The history behind the Rule, and the case law 
interpreting it, agree that the focus of the Rule is to promote the efficient 
adjudication of claims and encourage the “joinder of claims, parties and 
remedies” whenever its requirements are met.56 
The transactional relationship requirement refers to the relationship 
that the party to be joined has with an existing defendant, but 
specifically in relation to the transaction or occurrence for which that 
particular defendant is in court.57 The commonality requirement 
provides that a defendant may be joined if “any question of law or fact 
common to all defendants will arise in the action.”58 Both of these 
requirements must be met in order for a party to be joined as a 
defendant. Provision 20(a)(3) simply states that “a defendant need [not] 
be . . . defending against all the relief demanded[,] [and] [t]he court may 
grant judgment . . . against one or more defendants according to their 
liabilities.”59 
Lastly, provision 20(b) recites the court’s discretion in issuing orders 
that protect a party against embarrassment, delay, expense, or other 
prejudice that may arise from joinder of a person against whom the party 
asserts no claim.60 
D. Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Misjoinder and 
Nonjoinder 
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure serves a dual purpose 
when determining whether joinder is proper. The Rule first states that 
the existence of improper joinder—misjoinder—is not a ground for 
dismissing an action.61 Additionally, and maybe even more important to 
this Article’s discussion, the Rule gives the court the right to add or drop 
a party at any time after a party’s motion or in the court’s sole 
discretion.62 
The inclusion of Sections A, B, C, and D in this Part was meant to get 
 
 55. Id. at 20(a)(2). 
 56. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966) (“[J]oinder of claims, parties 
and remedies is strongly encouraged”). 
 57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). 
 58. Id. at 20(a)(2)(B). 
 59. Id. at 20(a)(3). 
 60. Id. at 20(b). 
 61. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 
 62. Id.  
8
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the reader up to speed on some basic procedural concepts that will assist 
in the reading of this Article. Having dealt with these procedural 
concepts, Sections E and F will explore some technical concepts that 
will help the reader understand the role that technological advances have 
had in file-sharing, and in turn, how file-sharing has shaped piracy 
practices. 
E. Client-Server vs. Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing 
The creation of the Internet and the rapid evolution of technology 
created new and more streamlined ways of sharing information. Before 
long, a new form of sharing files was created: peer-to-peer or P2P, for 
short.63 With the use of software, any person with an internet connection 
can join a P2P network and start sharing files with other users in the 
network.64 By joining a P2P network, a user—also known as a “peer”—
is able to access files from other peers’ computers and can both 
download and contribute files to other peers in the network.65 This 
method of sharing files is a shift from the P2P’s predecessor, the client-
server model.66 In the file-sharing context, the client-server model works 
by creating a direct connection between two computers in order to 
initiate the sharing of a file. For instance, instead of joining a network, 
person A connects to person B directly and person A’s copy of a 
particular song can easily be directly shared with person B. While the 
client-server model still has its uses, the P2P model solved some of the 
client-server model’s issues, such as transfer speed and efficiency.67 
The client-server model requires a computer to act as the server—the 
main computer that regulates the activity within the network—and any 
computer that connects to it becomes a client.68 The centralized nature 
of this model means that the network is only as fast and as efficient as 
the computer acting as the server.69 Although the server can handle more 
than one simultaneous connection, the transfer speed from the server to 
 
 63. See generally James Bruce, How P2P (Peer to Peer) File Sharing Works, MAKEUSEOF.COM 
(Aug. 24, 2012), https://www.makeuseof.com/tag/p2p-peer-peer-file-sharing-works/ 
[https://perma.cc/EF3M-DM3L] (P2P is a method of distribution based on a network of users that act as 
client and servers simultaneously in order to facilitate the transferring of files). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. By “predecessor” the Author means that the client-server model used to be the standard for 
file-sharing purposes before the P2P model was adopted. However, this does not mean that the client-
server model is outdated or has been abandoned. The client-server model is still utilized for other 
purposes. 
 67. See generally Bruce, supra note 63. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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the clients is limited by the server’s broadband’s connection speed.70 
Much like people sharing a pizza, as the number of simultaneous clients 
increases, the transfer speed from the server to each client decreases—
that is, each client gets a smaller piece of the pie.  
As technology evolved and “bigger, faster, and better” became a need 
rather than a want, the P2P model solved some of the problems that 
came with its file-sharing predecessor. By joining a P2P network, each 
peer is able to be a client and a server at the same time.71 This meant that 
as opposed to the client-server model, a P2P network allowed users to 
share each of their resources for the benefit of the network, significantly 
increasing the availability of files that can be shared at a given point in 
time.72 Using the previous pizza-sharing analogy, every peer that joins 
the P2P network is considered to have brought a pizza of his own that 
can then be shared with the group. So, in the P2P model, the more users 
participating in the network, the more easily available files become—the 
more pizza there is for everyone to share. This relationship between 
peers abandoned the centralized nature of the client-server model and 
decentralized the sharing of files through P2P protocols.73 While many 
P2P protocols have come and gone, there is one that revolutionized the 
way P2P networks are utilized: the BitTorrent Protocol. 
F. The BitTorrent Protocol 
The BitTorrent Protocol (“BT Protocol”) upped the ante of P2P 
networks by essentially utilizing the benefits of a P2P network and 
increasing transfer speed and efficiency.74 With the benefit of a 
decentralized network the BT Protocol transferred larger files with a 
relatively small impact on transfer speed.75 Large files are broken down 
into smaller pieces with unique identifiers that a BitTorrent client—
software that is installed in the user’s computer—keeps track of. Using 
these trackers, a peer no longer gets the entire file from a single 
computer but instead gets pieces from other peers who have already 
downloaded them.76 Once all the pieces have been downloaded, the 
BitTorrent client takes all of these pieces and assembles them into a 
complete file using the unique piece identifiers, much like pieces of a 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Bruce, supra note 63. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally Chris Woodford, How Does BitTorrent Work? EXPLAINTHATSTUFF! (Oct. 22, 
2017), http://www.explainthatstuff.com/howbittorrentworks.html [https://perma.cc/2NXX-DWHC]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.  
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puzzle.77 Because each peer acts as a server and a client 
simultaneously—downloading the file from others and making it 
available for newer peers—as a peer successfully downloads a piece of 
the file, other peers are able to download that particular piece from him 
or her.78 
The BT Protocol has not only contributed to the availability of files 
but also effectively increased their transfer speeds.79 Additionally, due to 
its decentralized nature, the lack of a main server took away most of the 
accountability for its use or misuse.80 It is precisely its misuse potential 
that made the BT Protocol so attractive to pirates, since the lack of a 
main server means that they are able to download files from other peers 
and if one peer gets “taken down” the others can continue to share the 
files.81 While the BT Protocol is used to share all kinds of files, legally 
and illegally, it is the latter that accounts for most of its use.82 
III. BITTORRENT CASE LAW 
The increase in popularity of P2P networks and the BT Protocol 
allows users to share files with a speed and volume that exceed any 
foreseeable expectations. This Part explores the copyright holders’ 
continuous fight to exercise their rights against users sharing protected 
works using P2P networks: from the RIAA series of lawsuits in the early 
2000s and up until the latest BitTorrent case adjudicated by the District 
Court for the District of Nevada. 
A. The RIAA Picks a Fight with P2P File-Sharers 
In September of 2003, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) filed copyright infringement suits against more than 
200 individual defendants83 for engaging in P2P file-sharing of 
copyrighted songs.84 While the move was technically unprecedented85 
 
 77. Bruce, supra note 63.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally Johan Pouwelse, The BitTorrent P2P File-Sharing System, THE REGISTER 
(Dec. 18, 2004), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/18/bittorrent_measurements_analysis/ 
[https://perma.cc/QST6-RAMG]. 
 81. Bruce, supra note 63. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Various news articles reporting on the lawsuits concur that the initial number of suits was 
261. While the actual complaints are not available to the public, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has a 
sample redacted copy available at https://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/sample_riaa_complaint.pdf 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170206224925/https://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/sample_riaa_complaint.pdf]. 
 84. See RIAA v. The People: Five Years Later, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Sept. 30, 
2008), https://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-five-years-later [https://perma.cc/QV2H-FXKF]; see also 
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and it seemed counterintuitive for the organization to be suing its 
customers, the RIAA explained that it was the beginning of a movement 
that they hope would get P2P users to stop “offering [and sharing] music 
that does not belong to them.”86 This initial round of lawsuits had a 
shocking effect, mainly because it found target on some unsuspecting 
defendants.87 Nonetheless, this did not slow down the RIAA’s resolve 
and more lawsuits would later be added to the initial 261 defendants.88 It 
seemed as though the RIAA would not rest until it accomplished its 
mission, and the RIAA remained unapologetic throughout the process.89 
Although the RIAA ultimately lost the war90 by the time the RIAA 
stopped pursuing individual defendants,91 the number of lawsuits had 
reached somewhere over 30,000.92 In the end, the RIAA was at least 
 
David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED (May 18, 2010), 
https://www.wired.com/2010/05/riaa-bump/ [https://perma.cc/CHC2-UJN5]. 
 85. See RIAA Brings Attack to Customers, Sues College Students, THE MAC OBSERVER (Apr. 3, 
2003), 
https://www.macobserver.com/tmo/article/RIAA_Brings_Attack_To_Customers_Sues_College_Student
s [https://perma.cc/F3RG-TQYS] (The RIAA had already sued four college students a few months 
alleging that the students were “operating a sophisticated network designed to enable widespread music 
thievery”). 




 87. See Music Firms Target 12-Year-Old, BBC NEWS (Sept. 10, 2003), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/3096340.stm [https://perma.cc/K279-PKAU] (One of the initial 
261 defendants, 12 year-old Brianna LaHara, ended up settling for $2,000); see also RIAA Sues 
Deceased Grandmother, GEEK.COM (Feb. 8, 2005), https://www.geek.com/law/riaa-sues-deceased-
grandmother-558332/ [https://perma.cc/TLB7-B8J8] (In 2005 the RIAA lawsuit reached Gertrude 
Walton, who had been deceased for some time). 
 88. See Jay Lyman, RIAA Sues More P2P Users, TECHNEWSWORLD (Dec. 4, 2003), 
https://www.technewsworld.com/story/32308.html [https://perma.cc/89Q5-HHKP] (The RIAA sued 
another 41 defendants in late 2003); see also Associated Press, RIAA Sues 532 Alleged Music Swappers, 
NBC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2004), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4018675/ns/technology_and_science-
games/t/riaa-sues-alleged-music-swappers/#.Ws2Omr3waiY [https://perma.cc/JU3B-7X3B] (Another 
round of 532 defendants were sued by the RIAA in January 2004; see also RIAA v. The People, supra 
note 84 (In 2007 the RIAA would broaden its focus and start targeting schools as well). 
 89. See RIAA v. The People, supra note 84 (When the lawsuit found another absurd target in an 
elder grandmother for allegedly downloading hard-core rap using a piece of software that was 
incompatible with her computer, the RIAA stated that “[w]hen you go fishing with a driftnet, sometimes 
you catch a dolphin”). 
 90. See David Silverman, Why the Recording Industry Really Stopped Suing Its Customers, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 22, 2008), https://hbr.org/2008/12/why-the-riaa-stopped-suing 
[https://perma.cc/WF76-ZHSZ] (The high costs of keeping up the large number of individual lawsuits 
led the RIAA to eventually drop the individual suits tactic in its war against copyright infringement). 
 91. See James Dye, Who’s Walking the Plank?: The Recording Industry’s Fight to Stop Music 
Piracy, 6 PGH. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 5 (1964) (Dye offers that the campaign, with 261 initial complaints 
was a “shining example[] of judicial inefficiency given the similarity of the claims and the actions” that 
brought about the lawsuits). 
 92. See Eliot Van Buskirk, RIAA to Stop Suing Music Fans, Cut Them Off Instead, WIRED (Dec. 
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able to spearhead the current practice of copyright infringement notices 
provided by ISPs whenever infringing activity is detected.93 
The RIAA’s efforts did not end with its suits against individual file-
sharers, but also broadened its scope to include the companies 
developing the software that enabled the infringing. One of the most 
popular examples of this is the RIAA’s lawsuit against LimeWire in 
2010.94 A federal court found that LimeWire95 was secondarily liable for 
encouraging the direct infringement of the plaintiffs’ works96 and 
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.97 Following the test applied 
by the United States Supreme Court in Grokster,98 the Court found that 
LimeWire was aware of the substantial infringement by its users,99 
marketed its software’s capabilities of infringement,100 and engaged in 
efforts to enable and assist with the infringement.101 Although the case 
against LimeWire did not include a swarm joinder, it was one of the few 
victories that the RIAA had in its long mission to stop P2P file-sharing 
and the piracy practices that the model enabled. 
B. The Legislature Chimes In 
In the aftermath of the RIAA’s attempt to shed light on the illegality 
of downloading and sharing protected works, the legislature attempted 
to bring some order to the piracy problem that did not slow down, in 
spite of the RIAA’s efforts. One example of such attempts was the 
introduction of the Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”)102 in late 2011. 
 
19, 2008), https://www.wired.com/2008/12/riaa-says-it-pl/ [https://perma.cc/DD3E-4FNN]; see also 
RIAA v. The People, supra note 84. 
 93. See Van Buskirk, supra note 92. 
 94. Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 715 F. Supp. 2d 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 95. LimeWire was a file-sharing program that utilized the P2P model and allowed for users to 
download copyrighted materials. 
 96. See Arista at 492 (While Arista Records was the name plaintiff, there were over a dozen 
major recording companies including BMG Music, Capitol Records, Inc., Virgin Records America, Inc., 
Warner Bros Records Inc., Sony Corporation of America, Atlantic Recording Corporation, and the 
Recording Industry Association of America.)  
 97. Id. at 524. 
 98. See MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (Stating that in order to 
determine whether the defendant intended to entice its customers to violate the copyright of the plaintiff, 
three factors needed to be analyzed: (1) whether the defendant’s purpose was to supply the demand for 
copyright infringers, as supported by its marketing efforts; (2) whether the defendant made efforts to 
create filter or mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity through use of its software; and (3) 
whether the infringing activity was of financial value to the defendant). 
 99. Arista at 510. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 511. 
 102. House Bill H.R.3261, widely known as the Stop Online Piracy Act or SOPA, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3261 [https://perma.cc/7XHA-SSUN]. 
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While SOPA’s objective was to give copyright holders some recourse 
against pirate sites whose servers were overseas (and outside U.S. 
jurisdiction), the protocols introduced by the bill put virtually any 
Internet website at risk of censorship.103 The “Internet community”104 
rallied hard against the enactment of SOPA and its Senate counterpart 
PIPA,105 encouraging website owners to “blackout” their websites and 
culminating in the indefinite shelving of both bills.106 However, it is 
unlikely that the legislature will completely abandon its efforts to come 
up with laws that provide recourse for copyright holders, given the 
threat that piracy poses to commercial parties of all industries.107 
C. The Courts Pick It Up from There  
After the legislature failed to enact SOPA and PIPA—laws seeking to 
prevent the propagation of piracy—there have been no significant 
subsequent bills introduced. However, pirates wait for no one, and the 
courts have been responsible for picking up the slack left by the failed 
bills. To do this, courts have resorted to the usual suspects, including the 
FRCP and case law. 
Before the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia weighed in 
on the properness of swarm joinder in AF Holdings,108 the district 
courts’ opinions were more or less evenly distributed, yet still favored 
the rejection of its use.109 The District Court for the Northern District of 
California is a good example of this ambivalence. In May of 2011, it 
denied a plaintiff’s motion to join almost 2,100 defendants in one 
 
 103. For a good introduction to how SOPA was supposed to work, see 
http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/17/technology/sopa_explained/index.htm [https://perma.cc/JF29-PAST]. 
 104. See Julianne Pepitone, SOPA and PIPA Protest Hits the Streets in New York, CNN MONEY 
(Jan. 18, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/18/technology/sopa_protest/index.htm 
[https://perma.cc/A9G6-RSC7] (Thousands of Internet users in different cities around the United States 
supported by important figures in the “Silicon Valley” scene such as Caterina Fake, co-founder of 
Flickr, and representatives from Mozilla, Google, Wikipedia, and Reddit).  
 105. Senate bill S.968 commonly known as the Protect IP Act or PIPA available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/senate-bill/968 [https://perma.cc/89H3-2UG3]. 
 106. More information on the movement can be found at http://www.sopastrike.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/93BN-8XE8]. 
 107. See Amy Rosen, The Big Lawsuits Keep on Coming, an Analysis of Extortive Pornographic 
“Trolling Lawsuits” and Preventative Approaches, 30 Ent. & Sports Law. 1, 1 (2014) (Rosen rightly 
points out that even the pornography industry, being so powerful, is worried about the availability of 
free pornography material). 
 108. AF Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 752 F.3d 990 (2014). 
 109. See Stefan Mentzer & Michael La Marca, Joinder and Early Discovery in BitTorrent 
Copyright Infringement Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 89, 116 (2015) (Mentzer and La 
Marca provide a very useful comparison table of district court decisions from 2011 through 2014). 
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action.110 Later that year, the Court allowed the plaintiff to join 18 
defendants111 and it stated that, as opposed to other cases, the plaintiff 
here was attempting to join “only 18 Doe Defendants – not hundreds or 
thousands.”112 Just one month after, the Court denied another joinder 
motion, but in this case it did so because it found that the plaintiffs did 
not provide enough evidence that the requirements for FRCP 20 had 
been met.113 Later that year, in August of 2011, the Court once more 
found swarm joinder impermissible for not meeting FRCP 20 
requirements.114 Nonetheless, a couple of months after that decision, the 
Court allowed a plaintiff to join 39 defendants.115 However, the Court 
rested its decision on the fact that the plaintiff had provided supporting 
documentation that was specific enough to determine that “the 39 Doe 
Defendants [] were part of the same swarm[]” and, as such, met the 
transactional requirement of FRCP 20.116 
Contrasting the California decisions, the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois initially consistently allowed the swarm 
joinder of defendants.117 In a case decided in 2012, the Court took a 
slightly different view from the previous ones and added some 
qualifications to its ruling.118 Although it also allowed joinder, it 
informed the plaintiffs that they would only be able to communicate 
with the defendants through counsel and not directly.119 Additionally, 
and recognizing the emergence of “trolling” tactics,120 the Court allowed 
defendants to continue to use pseudonyms at least through the discovery 
phase to prevent any embarrassment or other tactics that may lead to 
coercion.121 
 
 110. See Diabolic Video Prods. v. Does 1-2099, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58351, at *15 (N.D. Cal. 
May 31, 2011). 
 111. See MCGIP, LLC v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64188, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2011). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Pac. Century Int'l Ltd. v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73837, at *13 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 
2011). 
 114. See Hard Drive Prods. v. Does 1-188, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2011) 
(“[T]here is no evidence to suggest that each of the addresses acted in concert with all of the others.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 115. See OpenMind Sols., Inc. v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116552, at *18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 
2011). 
 116. Id. 
 117. See Mgcip v. Doe, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61879 (N.D. Ill. June 9, 2011) (allowing joinder at 
least during the initial phase of the case, stating that the issue of improper joinder was premature); see 
also First Time Videos, LLC v. Doe, 276 F.R.D. 241 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same); see also First Time 
Videos, LLC v. Does 1-76, 276 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (same). 
 118. See generally Sunlust Pictures, LLC v. Doe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121368 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 
27, 2012). 
 119. Id. at *14. 
 120. See Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1105 (2015). 
 121. See Sunlust Pictures, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121368 at *15.  
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IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN AND CELL FILM HOLDINGS 
Just like the California and Illinois courts, other districts have issued 
different decisions regarding the properness of swarm joinder. Some 
courts have found in favor and some against swarm joinder; some 
decisions were based on number of defendants the plaintiffs wanted to 
join and some others were based on meeting—or failing to meet—the 
requirements of FRCP 20.122 Before long, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia became the first—and at the time of this Article’s 
writing, the only—Circuit Court to weigh in on the issue.123 In the years 
leading up to the D.C. Circuit’s decision, District Courts in the District 
of Columbia had consistently allowed joinder124 with the exception of a 
case in 2012.125 
The D.C. Circuit Court tackled the issue by providing a background 
on the parties involved, paying special attention to the plaintiff.126 
Explaining the background and methodology of the plaintiff’s lawsuit, 
the court stated that the lawsuit was “a quintessential example” of the 
modus operandi of plaintiffs who sue only to be able to coerce 
defendants to settle instead of to exercise their protection rights.127 
Speaking to jurisdiction concerns, the Court stated that the plaintiff had 
“made absolutely no effort to limit its suit . . . to those defendants who 
might live or have downloaded [the protected work] in the District of 
Columbia.”128 Addressing the issue of joinder, the Court stated that the 
plaintiff had “provided no reason to think that the Doe defendants” had 
 
 122. See Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55413 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013) 
(denying joinder because plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to prove the required logic relationship 
between the defendants to support joinder); see also Combat Zone, Inc. v. Doe, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
35439 (D. Mass. Feb. 20, 2013) (although the court refused to determine whether joinder was proper 
under FRCP 20, it exercised its discretion under FRCP 20(b) to sever all defendants but one); but see 
Liberty Media Holdings v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444 (D. Mass. 2011) (finding 
joinder was proper at that stage of the litigation because the requirements were met by the plaintiff); see 
also Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Doe, 286 F.R.D. 160 (D. Mass. 2012) (also finding joinder proper at the 
early stage of litigation but preserving the defendants’ right to revisit the issue of improper joinder at a 
later time). 
 123. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 990. 
 124. See Call of the Wild Movie, LLC v. Does 1-1,062, 770 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.D.C. 2011); see 
also Donkeyball Movie, LLC v. Doe, 810 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2011); see also W. Coast Prods. v. 
Doe, 275 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 125. See Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 286 F.R.D. 113 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding joinder improper for 
not meeting the FRCP 20 requirements). 
 126. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 992 (2014) (The court explained that AF Holdings was attorney 
Paul A. Duffy who was associated with Prenda Law. The court when ahead and stated that Prenda Law 
was a “porno-trolling collective[]” that acquired copyrights to pornographic movies only to initiate 
massive John Doe copyright infringement lawsuits). 
 127. Id. at 993. 
 128. Id. at 996. 
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been part of the same “swarm” at the same time129 but rather only 
provided snapshots of the defendants’ activities spanning a period of 
five months.130 The Court found this supporting evidence and timeframe 
to be far too removed to be able to link the defendants as required by 
FRCP 20.131 
In the years following the AF Holdings decision, the balance of 
district court decisions supporting and opposing joinder has skewed 
severely towards severing defendants and denying joinder. With a few 
exceptions,132 most district courts now fall within the large majority 
denying joinder due to either lack of efficiency,133 failure to meet FRCP 
20 requirements,134 or inconvenience and prejudice that can result from 
joining multiple defendants.135 
At the time of the inception of this Article, the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada decision in Cell Film Holdings LLC v. 
Acosta136 was the latest decision addressing swarm joinder to be fully 
adjudicated.137 However, while this Article was being written, the 
District Court for the Western District of Washington issued an opinion 
on the matter in POW Nev., LLC v. Doe.138 In POW, twelve defendants 
were sued for using the BT Protocol to download the plaintiff’s movie 
“Revolt.”139 The plaintiff argued that the defendants should be joined in 
a swarm because they resided in the same district and downloaded the 
protected work within the same period of time.140  
 
 129. Id. at 998. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. See e.g. Cell Film Holdings, LLC v. Does, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180445, at *11 (E.D. Va. 
Dec. 29, 2016); and Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5623 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(in both cases, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois allowed joinder). 
 133. See ME2 Prods. v. Doe, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163319, at *8 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 28, 2016) 
(“Because joinder in this case would not result in judicial economy, the Court exercises its discretion to 
sever the claims against each Defendant.”). 
 134. See Cobbler Nev., LLC v. Doe, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160665, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 1, 
2015) (“that the defendants all used the same file sharing network . . . are analogous to the previous P2P 
actions where courts found such allegations insufficient to sustain permissive joinder.”). 
 135. See Cell Film Holdings, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180445, at *11 (E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2016) 
(“Like others, this Court becomes wary of inefficient, unmanageable, and potentially prejudicial joinder 
of multiple defendants.”). 
 136. See Cell Film Holdings LLC v. Acosta, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 (D. Nev. Nov. 29, 
2017) (This case is one of three identical cases that were filed by the plaintiff Cell Film Holdings 
(CFH). These cases were CFH v. Acosta, CFH v. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, and CFH v. 
Galang U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195858 (D. Nev., Nov. 29, 2017)). 
 137. There was another decision in March 2018 but the determination of joinder properness was 
left for another time. See Venice PI, LLC v. Doe, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53842 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 30, 
2018). 
 138. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 24, 2018). 
 139. See POW Nev., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11708 at *3. 
 140. Id. 
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Following the lead of the D.C. Circuit and the Nevada District court, 
the Washington District court also denied joinder for the plaintiff, 
saying that the FRCP 20 requirements were not met and that even if the 
requirements had been met, the plaintiff had “fail[ed] to comport with 
the principles of fundamental fairness.”141 For the most part, the POW 
Court echoed the arguments provided by the Nevada District and the 
D.C. Circuit courts, along with those other districts that had similarly 
denied joinder on similar grounds.142 
Although POW was decided after the Cell Film Holdings decision, 
this Article will briefly discuss the Cell Film Holdings decision as 
cementing the precedent that the D.C. Circuit set, and that POW would 
later follow. 
The Cell Film Holdings Court began its analysis of the properness of 
swarm joinder by briefly acknowledging the authority split on the 
issue.143 The Court eloquently said that the split among the districts—
and only touched by the D.C. Circuit at the appellate level—reflected 
how the only thing that was clear was that “there is no uniform 
protocol.”144 Immediately after, the Court stepped out of a stance it had 
taken in the past, declining to address the properness of swarm 
joinder,145 and decidedly joined “those courts that hold that [FRCP 20] 
does not permit swarm joinder.”146 The Court proceeded to analyze the 
transactional requirement of FRCP 20 and concluded that none of the 
data provided by the plaintiffs suggested that the defendants had “acted 
in concert as part of the same transaction or occurrence.”147 Therefore, 
the Court severed the claims of all of the defendants without prejudice, 
with the exception of one defendant.148 The remainder of the Court’s 
decision was spent on the only defendant that was not severed from the 
lawsuit. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The Cell Film Holdings and the D.C. Circuit’s decisions have 
undoubtedly influenced the decisions that have come after them. 
Nonetheless, more nuanced decisions, such as those made by the 
 
 141. Id. at *5. 
 142. See generally Id. 
 143. See Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *7. 
 144. Id. at *8. 
 145. See LHF Prods. v. Smith, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *2 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (The 
court had declined to address whether FRCP 20 allowed swarm joinder in a previous case concluding 
that joinder was permissibly improper rather than improper for failure to meet FRCP 20 requirements). 
 146. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *9. 
 147. Id. at *11. 
 148. Id. at *11-12. 
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Northern District of Illinois, have kept the split alive and provide ripe 
timing for an in-depth discussion about the properness of swarm joinder 
in BitTorrent cases. The vast majority of district courts have found in 
FRCP 20 a way to keep copyright infringement claims in a relatively 
simple setting: one-on-one. These courts mainly argue that, by doing 
this, “trolls” are discouraged. While “trolling” practices are undoubtedly 
troubling, this Article suggests that precluding swarm joinder is not the 
best way to address the issue. This point of view, while certainly not a 
popular one, seeks to contrast the increasingly common cynicism with 
which plaintiffs in BitTorrent cases are met.149 While district courts have 
grounded their denials of swarm joinder quoting other districts and the 
D.C. Circuit as persuasive authority, in some cases they resort to siding 
with other courts without engaging in the analysis that the D.C. Circuit 
engaged in. In other cases where the courts indeed follow the D.C. 
Circuit’s analysis, the courts use FRCP 21 as an escape hatch to justify 
the denial of joinder, even if unwarranted.150  
There is certainly a small number of scholarly writings in support of 
swarm joinder that provide some good arguments,151 and others that 
offer sensible approaches to the issue while not necessarily taking a 
stand.152 Nevertheless, the Cell Film Holdings decision did not care to 
address any of these proposed arguments and instead focused on the 
majority’s view.153 The repercussion of this decision—as evidenced by 
the subsequent POW decision—calls for another look at the arguments 
in favor of swarm joinder. This Part will present these arguments in two 
sections, first looking at permissibility of swarm joinder as a matter of 
law and then at desirability of swarm joinder as a matter of policy. The 
latter section will also look at other arguments that have been presented 
in opposition of swarm joinder and discuss the reasons why they are 
flawed or, in some cases, obsolete.  
 
 149. See generally Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1 through 10, 2012 WL 5382304 (C.D. Cal. 
June 27, 2012). 
 150. Compare LHF Prods. v. Smith, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, *8 (D. Nev. October 23, 
2017) (Denying to engage in FRCP 20 analysis and grounding its decision on FRCP 21 instead) with 
ME2 Prods., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184021, at *12-13 (Ruling that even if the defendant had indeed 
met the requirements of FRCP 20, permissive joinder was more of a burden on the defendants than on 
the plaintiff). 
 151. See John C. Heinbockel, The Undiscovered Country: Fixing Copyright By Rethinking 
Pretrial Litigation, 5 AM. U. INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 152 (2014). 
 152. See Morgan E. Pietz, Copyright Court: A New Approach to Recapturing Revenue Lost to 
Infringement, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1 (2017). 
 153. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 (The opinion is indeed very short. The 
court acknowledges the position of other districts but does not mention any of the arguments they offer 
to support permissive joinder in BitTorrent cases).  
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A. Joinder Should Be Permitted as A Matter of Law 
Because a swarm joinder meets the statutory requirements under 
FRCP 20, the “fundamental fairness” factors, and does not affect the 
courts’ powers under FRCP 21, courts can and should allow plaintiffs to 
join defendants as part of a swarm, if they are reasonably related 
geographically and in time. 
1. Swarm Joinder Meets the Requirements of FRCP 20 
Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows for plaintiffs 
and defendants to be joined in judicial actions, provided that the parties 
to be joined meet two requirements: transactional relationship and 
commonality.154 Swarm joinder meets both requirements under the Rule 
and should be allowed, at least during the initial stages of the litigation, 
to let the plaintiff get the necessary identity information to properly 
name the defendants. 
The transactional relationship requirement asks for the party sought to 
be joined to be liable to the plaintiff for relief “with respect to or arising 
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or 
occurrences[.]”155 Some courts have interpreted the Rule’s language too 
narrowly, sometimes stating that because the defendants did not know 
each other, their actions could not be part of a transactional 
relationship.156 However, the Rule’s use of the word “or” indicates that 
its correct interpretation should be much broader. Namely, that a 
plaintiff’s right against a defendant must arise out of either the same 
transaction, or the same occurrence, or the same series of transactions or 
the same series of occurrences. A user that is part of the same BitTorrent 
swarm would definitely fall within this broad interpretation of the 
language. 
This broader interpretation calls for allowing swarm joinder in 
BitTorrent cases. The very nature of the BT Protocol is the biggest 
reason for allowing swarm joinder. The client-server protocol required 
User A to act as a server, allowing other users to be User A’s clients and 
download files made available by User A. Once these users had obtained 
the files, they themselves would become servers by way of having files 
in their shared folder for other users to download. In this protocol, it 
 
 154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Hard Drive, 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1163 (grounding part of its decision in the lack of 
evidence suggesting that each of the defendants had “acted in concert” with each other while illegally 
downloading the protected works). 
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made sense that in order for two or more users to be transactionally 
linked for purposes of FRCP 20, the plaintiff needed to prove that at any 
given point in time defendant 1 was (as a server) providing defendant 2 
(as a client) with a file to download. A plaintiff then would be able to 
prove that defendants 1 and 2 were part of the same transaction. 
However, the BT Protocol turned this relationship on its head and 
made it so that defendants 1 and 2 are each other’s client and server at 
the same time while simultaneously allowing defendants 3 and 4 to join 
in as clients and servers as well; and so on, and so on. Admittedly, some 
decisions have raised valid points expressing the difficulty of justifying 
a broader interpretation of a “same transaction” when the plaintiff is 
joining several defendants from all over the country.157 However, while 
in earlier cases plaintiffs were attempting to join dozens, hundreds, or 
sometimes thousands of defendants, plaintiffs in recent cases have 
driven this number down to manageable numbers.158 Similarly, plaintiffs 
in recent cases have learned from previous decisions and have limited 
the timeframe in which they focus, seeking joinder of defendants that 
have interacted with the BitTorrent software over shorter periods of 
time.159  
The Cell Film Holdings Court, in justifying its decision, referred to an 
analogy that the D.C. Circuit used illustrating why FRCP 20 does not 
permit swarm joinder. In short, the D.C. Circuit said that two BitTorrent 
users who downloaded the same file at different times were like two 
individuals who played at the same blackjack table at different times. 
The Court offered: “[while the defendants] may have won the same 
amount of money . . . and perhaps even played with the same dealer, [] 
they still engaged in entirely separate transactions.”160 
This analogy may have worked in a client-server protocol scenario 
where defendants 2 and 3 needed to be downloading the file from 
defendant 1 at the same time, so as to be sitting at the same proverbial 
blackjack table. The problem with this analogy, however, is that it does 
not hold true against the reality of BitTorrent swarms. The analogy 
ignores that in a BitTorrent swarm—at least when it comes to 
 
 157. See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 339 (Plaintiffs were trying to join 1,062 
unnamed defendants to the lawsuit); see also AF Holdings, 752 F.3d 990 at 994 (Plaintiff was trying to 
join 1,058 defendants, without evidence supporting that they had minimum contacts with the District of 
Columbia). 
 158. E.g. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *4 (Plaintiffs initiated the lawsuit seeking to 
join 16 defendants, later amended their claim reducing the number to 12, and ending with a motion to 
join only 3 defendants); see also LHF Prods. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *5 (Plaintiffs brought 
an initial claim against 21 defendants, reducing it to 17, and ending with only 4). 
 159. E.g. McCray, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196624, at *11 (Plaintiffs had selected defendants 
within a time span of only 6 days). 
 160. Cell Film Holdings, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 195864 at *11 (citing AF Holdings). 
21
Peña-Porras: Denying Swarm Joinder in BitTorrent Cases
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
632 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
defendants that participated in a swarm within a short span of time—
users are each other’s dealers, and one cannot play blackjack without a 
dealer. As more users join the swarm, the likelihood (and speed) of a 
successful download increases. The reality is that when defendants 
participate in a swarm that is connected in time, they all have acted as a 
blackjack dealer, enabling each other’s ability to play—that is, to obtain 
the infringing work. Understanding this important relationship between 
members of a swarm can avoid misinterpretations that prejudice the 
plaintiffs seeking swarm joinder.161 
The second requirement of FRCP 20 is the commonality of questions 
of fact or law. BitTorrent cases easily satisfy this requirement in both, 
questions of fact and of law. Most (if not all) of these actions relate to 
the illegal sharing of a particular work downloaded by all the 
defendants, violating the same copyright rights from the same owner. 
Permitting plaintiffs to join a reasonable number of defendants as 
members of a swarm not only comports with the requirements set under 
FRCP 20 but also fall squarely on the efficiency purpose behind the 
enactment of the Rule, which includes the promotion of trial 
convenience and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. 
2. Swarm Joinder Comports with the “Fundamental Fairness” Factors. 
In assessing the properness of swarm joinder under FRCP 20, courts 
have looked at an additional consideration dubbed “fundamental 
fairness,”162 which looks at different factors, such as: prejudice that may 
result to any of the parties; any delay of the moving party in seeking the 
joinder; the motive behind seeking joinder; the relationship between the 
new and old parties (similar to the transactional relationship 
requirement); whether joinder will affect the court’s jurisdiction; and the 
new party’s notice of the pending action.163 These factors can be 
succinctly addressed in the context of swarm joinder. While defendants 
may not be entirely comfortable being joined as a swarm, plaintiffs can 
be severely financially prejudiced if they are forced to pursue each 
 
 161. The court in Hard Drive Prods, 809 F. Supp. 2d stated that the six-week span covering the 
illegal activity weighed against the plaintiff’s case because it was unlikely that “an alleged infringer [] 
would patiently wait six weeks to collect the bits of the work” needed to be able to use the work as a 
whole. However, the court ignored the fact that users that join a swarm voluntarily decide to remain a 
part of the swarm for a period of time, not out of necessity but out of conviction. A user that remains in 
a swarm for a period of 6 weeks does so not because the user had to wait 6 weeks to download the 
protected work, but because the user decided to continue “seeding” the work (i.e. acting as a server) in 
order to allow other users to download it, before leaving the swarm. 
 162. See Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. of North America, 623 F.2d 1371, *1375, (9th Cir. 
Cal. July 25, 1980). 
 163. Id. 
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defendant separately.164 The plaintiffs are responsible for avoiding 
delays in seeking joinder and the courts can ensure that the plaintiffs are 
prompt in their request and use of discovery. The plaintiffs can exercise 
due diligence in selecting which defendants to join to satisfy 
transactional relationship requirements—such as geographical and time 
proximity—which would, at the same time, take care of any 
jurisdictional issues. The motive factor is admittedly a difficult one, but 
courts are well equipped to deal with litigation that is determined to be 
frivolous, unconscionable, or otherwise improper. 
3. Courts Still Retain Discretion under FRCP 21 
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grants courts the 
discretion to join or drop a party “at any time” whether “[o]n motion or 
on its own[.]”165 This Rule is entirely independent from FRCP 20 and 
does not require the court to look at FRCP 20 in order to exercise its 
discretion. 
So, while permitting swarm joinder in BitTorrent cases may have 
disadvantages due to the risks of frivolous and coercive litigation by 
“trolls,” this Article and some courts166 suggest that the potential for 
prejudice is outweighed by the potential for efficiency and the fact that 
allowing swarm joinder at the outset of a lawsuit does not mean that a 
court has waived its rights under FRCP 21. Therefore, a federal court 
can allow for a swarm joinder of defendants at the outset and, if at any 
time it determines that the plaintiff’s case is not in good faith, the court 
can exercise its rights under FRCP 21. 
The D.C. Circuit did a great job analyzing the plaintiff’s case and 
utilizing the tools available to rule on the properness of joinder in that 
case.167 The Court reviewed the requirements of FRCP 20 and 
contrasted them against the plaintiff’s claims.168 The Court then noticed 
the improperness of the number of defendants that the plaintiffs sought 
to join,169 the lack of attention to jurisdictional issues,170 and how these 
factors provided a prima facie conclusion that the plaintiffs were 
 
 164. At the time of this writing, each filing in federal court costs $350.00. Additionally, the 
plaintiffs’ legal fees would be multiplied by the number of defendants that they are suing. 
 165. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. 
 166. See Call of the Wild Movie, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (Granting swarm joinder at “this stage in 
the litigation” even though it reserved its rights as “[t]he defendants may be able to demonstrate 
prejudice once the plaintiffs proceed with their cases against them”). 
 167. See generally AF Holdings, 752 F.3d 990. 
 168. Id. at 998. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
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attempting to engage in trolling.171 The Court did not address FRCP 21, 
and instead mentioned that the plaintiffs could have tailored their claims 
to have a “reasonable basis for believing that the requirements for 
joinder would be satisfied[]” but had not done so.172 By doing this, the 
Court implied that the requirements of FRCP 20 are not automatically 
wanting in a swarm joinder case, and instead, the claims need to be 
analyzed on a case-by-case basis. 
B. Joinder Should Be Permitted as a Matter of Policy 
Through adjudication of BitTorrent cases, courts have created a 
record that contemplates both legal and policy arguments in favor or 
against allowing swarm joinder. This subsection will attempt to touch on 
some of the most commonly used arguments against the use of swarm 
joinder and address them individually. First, this subsection will briefly 
address an argument that seeks to minimize the effect and culpability of 
piracy. Second, the Article will address the stigma that the RIAA’s 
actions created and that weighs on today’s plaintiffs in BitTorrent cases. 
Third, the Article will present the argument of the innocent defendant. 
Fourth, the Article will briefly address another collateral argument often 
raised against swarm joinder. Lastly, the Article will expand on the 
concept of trolling, how denying swarm joinder does not fix the trolling 
problem and offer alternatives to address trolls. 
1. Piracy Is Not That Bad. 
Piracy, the violation of copyright holders’ rights, has considerable 
public policy implications in society.173 However, the public opinion 
seems to often find ways to justify partaking in piracy practices. 
Although it may be uncomfortable to compare the culpability of a pirate 
to that of a burglar, the reality is that, in both cases, a crime has been 
committed. The tendency to minimize the culpability of piracy is 
precisely what triggered the RIAA’s ire, and rightly so. Piracy is often 
seen as a victimless crime, but it is no more justifiable than tax evasion. 
The fact that a pirate victimizes copyright holders instead of the 
government should not automatically grant defendants with undue 
leniency. Regrettably, the massive widespread use of the BT Protocol 
and compatible software, making piracy a household practice, is not lost 
 
 171. Id.  
 172. AF Holdings, 752 F.3d at 998. 
 173. Be it direct impact on the industries to which the pirated works belong, as evidenced by the 
examples provided at the beginning of this Article, the availability of quality copyrighted work, or even 
the pricing of works of media. 
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on this Author. However, if there is ever a time when the legislature 
deems widespread practices lawful by virtue of their popularity, piracy 
may then be sanctioned. Until then, it is hard to imagine a day when 
breaking and entering might become acceptable if enough people do it. 
For the time being, plaintiffs should be allowed to make use of swarm 
joinder, as it represents one of the few tools they have to try and keep 
up. 
2. Plaintiffs Are Evil 
The Recording Industry Association of America’s crusade was the 
first time that an industry giant went after file-sharers for engaging in 
piracy practices. At the time, there was a widespread feeling of David 
against Goliath. The RIAA was chastised for going against its 
customers, most of whom had only downloaded a few songs. To this 
argument there are two points this Article urges the reader to consider. 
The first one is, since when should it matter that the pirates only 
downloaded a few songs? Should the police stop arresting anyone who 
only steals a few dollars? Should prosecutors stop going against the con 
man that defrauded only a few people? The truth of the matter is that 
culpability lies on the action just as much, if not more, than on what the 
wrongdoer got out of it. 
Second, the stigma that attached to all BitTorrent plaintiffs because of 
the actions of the RIAA is unwarranted. For the most part, BitTorrent 
plaintiffs then and now are differently situated. The RIAA’s objective 
was to prove a point and raise awareness. They wanted to make noise 
and make sure people knew that they were coming for the pirates. To 
accomplish this, the RIAA was willing to tap into its large proverbial 
pockets and file thousands of claims around the country for almost five 
years. Plaintiffs nowadays have different objectives and are no longer 
RIAA-sized or MPAA-sized companies with deep pockets and a team of 
lawyers that can fill up a van. Plaintiffs are now smaller film production 
studios that are not seeking to make a statement but rather get restitution 
for what they have lost in order to be able to move on to their next 
work.174 Not that this last point should matter too much, since the 
copyright statute does not concern itself with the size or financial 
resources of the copyright holder. Neither of these plaintiffs deserves 
less or more protection with respect to the illegal reproduction and 
distribution of their work, nor their right to seek restitution for damages 
suffered. However, the point still stands: plaintiffs can no longer be 
automatically shoved into a stereotypical box of greedy, faceless 
 
 174. For examples see generally the plaintiffs in cases supra note 158. 
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companies that are out on a hunt, because they do not fit the profile. 
Additionally, piracy practices were not as advanced as they are today. 
During the RIAA’s crusade, the client-server protocol was the standard. 
Nowadays, pirates can download material much easier and faster. 
Rejecting the use of swarm joinder when it is proper is to force plaintiffs 
to try and keep a sinking ship afloat but only allowing them to bail water 
out with a SOLO cup. 
Lastly, critics of BitTorrent plaintiffs, will find reasons to condemn 
their actions, regardless of whether swarm joinder is at issue. Although 
the RIAA sued individuals in their own district to avoid jurisdictional 
issues—avoiding the arguments that come with swarm joinder—the 
RIAA’s move was still criticized for being a “shining example of 
judicial inefficiency” due to the similarity of the claims.175 Had the 
RIAA sought to utilize swarm joinder, it would have most likely been 
the target of several of the arguments that criticize its use. A plaintiff-
averse mindset does not further the resolution of legal issues, especially 
when this mindset forces the plaintiffs to a position where they are 
“damned if [they] do [and] damned if [they] don’t.”176 
3. The Curious Case of the Innocent Defendant 
Critics of swarm joinder bring up time and time again the case of the 
innocent defendant. Succinctly put, this argument presents a 
hypothetical defendant whose identification information is obtained 
through the subpoenas issued by the court, yet this particular defendant 
is not the actual infringer. Often times this innocent defendant is 
portrayed as either an elderly person or an oblivious internet user whose 
lack of technological savvy creates vulnerability for others to use their 
wireless internet connection to illegally download pornographic 
protected material without the knowledge of the innocent defendant.177 
In this scenario, the defenseless lady is caught off guard by the notice of 
service and rather than risk being portrayed in the media as a 
downloader of pornography, she decides to settle in exchange of being 
dropped from the suit. 
Supporters of this theory continue to conjure up the image of the 
 
 175. See Dye, supra note 91. 
 176. The idiom “[you are] damned if you do and damned if you don’t” is used to describe 




 177. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 26 (offering how some of these swarm John Doe claims end up 
hailing innocent defendants into court as a result of joining the person that is paying the internet bill as 
opposed to the actual infringing user). 
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innocent defendant and contrast it with a portrayal of the tough, deep-
pocketed, greedy, intimidating plaintiff whose only concern is to make 
money and does not care who he has to “troll” in order to get it. This 
sentiment cannot necessarily be considered unfounded, since the RIAA 
did remain unapologetic as its efforts found target in what would be 
considered innocent defendants. However, the real contemporaneous 
picture is no longer so black and white. 
Concerns about “trolls” and “trolling” practices are certainly valid 
and—to the extent they portray a realistic picture—very troublesome. 
However, they ignore the changes that plaintiffs have made in order to 
address the potential risk of joining an innocent defendant and tend to 
blur the focus from what is at stake. The practice of “trolling,” as 
portrayed by the swarm joinder rejecters, had plaintiffs seeking to join 
hundreds and sometimes thousands of defendants at once. Nowadays the 
picture is a lot less drastic. Some plaintiffs have taken affirmative steps 
and developed criteria to determine which defendants they take to court, 
often voluntarily dropping several defendants from the lawsuit.178 While 
plaintiffs may still subpoena the identifying information of several 
defendants, they often utilize a filtered process to start dropping those 
defendants where there may be legitimate concerns about the culpability 
of the now identified defendant. This is not only a step in the right 
direction, but is also a show of good faith on behalf of the plaintiffs, 
demonstrating that their desire for restitution and exercise of their 
copyright protection does not mean they will trample over innocent 
people nor engage in questionable legal practices. 
Additionally, while the innocent grandma paints a very persuasive 
image, this Author believes that the innocent defendant theory should be 
on its way out, and—no pun intended—be nearing its retirement. In this 
day and age, the concept of a technologically illiterate defendant gets 
more and more suspect as time goes by. At the time of this writing, the 
vast majority of Internet Service Providers set up password-protected 
networks by default for their customers.179 The passwords are often a 
string of random alphanumerical characters, often printed on the actual 
router, that can only be accessed by the members of the household or 
visitors. Moreover, the elderly have grown consistently more receptive 
 
 178. E.g. LHF Prods., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175339, at *4-5 (Plaintiff “identified the 1-2% 
most egregious offenders and [sued them] in sets of 10-30 [per claim],” and further filtering according 
to the defenses raised by each defendant in an attempt to “impose the least expense on all parties 
involved—including the [c]ourt”). 
 179. Information available for Spectrum (formerly Time Warner Cable) on its website states that 
self-install kits come with pre-set passwords by default printed on the router. This information is 
available at https://www.spectrum.net/support/internet/self-install-spectrum-internet-and-wifi-service/. 
A subsequent conversation with a Spectrum customer service representative confirmed that all Spectrum 
installations come with a default Wi-Fi password as well. 
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to adopting newer technology, such as smartphones, computers, and 
devices that interact with the Internet-of-Things (IoT) protocol. Long 
gone are the days where having wireless Internet was something only 
for tech-savvy people; nowadays wireless Internet is the standard. 
Another factor often conveniently forgotten by objectors to swarm 
joinder is the fact that not all settlements arise out of shame, but may 
arise out of guilt. And the probability that a defendant is guilty increases 
when plaintiffs have already used criteria and filters to narrow down the 
number of defendants to be hailed into court. When a settlement is 
reached between the plaintiff and a guilty defendant, the settlement acts 
as a warranted retribution for the plaintiff and a deterrent for the 
defendant. However, when courts have a predisposed plaintiff-averse 
mindset and deny swarm joinder at the outset, neither party benefits. 
Commentators argue that there is “inherent[] embarrass[ment]”180 in 
associating a defendant with the download of porn, which effectively 
coerces the defendant to settle, lest the public associate their name with 
a pornographer. However, being accused of a crime is never something 
a defendant longs for, and a defendant who cares about their public 
image will find inherent embarrassment in any criminal trial, regardless 
of what the crime is. In the case of a presumably innocent defendant 
where the goal is to protect the defendant’s reputation, a plaintiff that 
believes a defendant is guilty will sue the defendant either way, so the 
reputation is not really protected and unnecessary costs are imposed on 
the plaintiff. However, in the case of guilty defendants, the denial of 
joinder only allows them to resume downloading pirated material, 
effectively asking the plaintiff to choose between exercising its rights or 
preserving its financial resources. 
Critics of the swarm joinder also ignore that a settlement is not a 
measure of guilt or innocence. If, even after the plaintiff has used 
selective criteria to narrow the number of defendants and the court has 
determined whether the plaintiff’s claim is in good faith, an innocent 
defendant is still hailed into court, the copyright statute itself allows for 
the courts to make the defendant whole by ordering the plaintiff to cover 
the defendant’s legal costs. However, because innocence or guilt is a 
determination that is almost impossible to make at the outset, courts 
should allow swarm joinder first and then force the plaintiffs to curtail 
their case to comport with fair standards, when needed, dropping any 
unjustified defendants from their claims. 
Allowing swarm joinder may very well impose a burden on 
defendants. However, no person inherently desires to be a defendant, or 
is a defendant by pure conviction. Reasonable measures can be taken to 
 
 180. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 28. 
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ensure the fair joinder of defendants and the punishment of abusive 
plaintiffs. For instance, consider prank calls to the 911 emergency 
services line. Emergency responders do not stop responding to every 
call just because the person calling may be a prank caller. Instead, 
emergency responders attend every call and punish prank callers 
whenever they encounter them. Although innocent defendants need to 
be protected from trolls, deforming FRCP 20 in the name of innocent 
defendants is not the proper way to do it. Instead, courts should favor 
the introduction of defendants to promote judicial efficiency while 
keeping safety controls handy for plaintiffs who abuse the system. 
4. Another Argument 
Critics of swarm joinder have, in numerous times, also raised 
collateral arguments while advocating against the properness of swarm 
joinder. One of these arguments relates to the privacy of the defendant, 
in conjunction with First Amendment rights. Critics say that by 
subpoenaing the defendants’ identifying information, their privacy is 
invaded181 and that by utilizing the BT Protocol to download protected 
work, the defendant is expressing his or her taste and style.182 This 
expression, defendants offer, should be entitled to First Amendment 
protection. However, courts have already determined that this 
compounded argument crumbles for two reasons. First, solid precedent 
has already established that an individual’s privacy is fragile and must 
give way to an author’s right to claim the protection of copyrighted 
work.183 Second, the release of identifying information does not 
encroach on the defendants’ First Amendment rights because the release 
does not threaten the prosecution of the expression of ideas but only 
seeks to identify defendants in order to be properly served.184 
5. Slaying Trolls 
Courts have often focused their decisions on attempts to eradicate 
trolling practices. However, the determination of whether swarm joinder 
is proper should be based on the requirements of FRCP 20 and notions 
of efficiency, justice, and fairness, and not on tangential issues. This 
does not mean that trolling practices should be kept unchecked, but there 
are alternatives that courts can use to minimize the damage caused by 
trolls, without having to sacrifice one of the very few recourses that 
 
 181. See Rosen, supra note 107 at 27. 
 182. See generally Id. 
 183. Rosen, supra note 107 at 27. 
 184. Id. 
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plaintiffs have to enforce their copyright protection rights. 
A plaintiff is unreasonably characterized as a troll if the plaintiff is 
seeking a settlement. However, the pursuit of a settlement should not be 
the deciding factor of whether a plaintiff is a “troll” because judicial 
policy itself encourages settlements.185 Moreover, litigation costs for 
both parties can run high and a plaintiff is not a “troll” for simply 
wanting to avoid unnecessary costs. Instead, the focus should turn to 
whether the plaintiff has the intent of taking the case to trial and arguing 
it on the merits. If courts permit joinder of carefully selected defendants, 
the plaintiff can get one sizable judgment and move on. The alternative, 
however, is not as straightforward, but rather burdensome. If a court 
denies swarm joinder, the plaintiff is forced to go against twenty 
different defendants individually, increasing its costs and decreasing the 
chance that it will obtain enough remuneration to justify and offset 
them. And, the defendants are still forced to go through the costly hassle 
of trial and risk ending up with a judgment that can certainly ruin their 
financial future. 
While it is true that “trolling” is a disreputable practice, it is important 
for courts to remain focused on the matter at hand and not adopt a 
presumption of evil motives against all plaintiffs.186 The American 
judicial system already has a presumption of innocence favoring the 
defendants. There is no need for the courts to exacerbate the plaintiff’s 
already high burden with a presumption of evil that ends up forcing 
them to unfairly pay more for exercising their right to be paid for their 
work. 
With absolutely no intention of justifying “trolling” practices, it is 
worth mentioning that if “trolls” exist it is largely because of the 
existence of pirates. Some commentators argue that “trolls” are now 
simply looking at ways to create work, without much quality, only to 
use it as bait for the pirates and to give plaintiffs standing to sue.187 Be 
that as it may, the constitutional provision granting copyright protection 
does not concern itself with the intent of the author when it creates the 
work, but only with whether the work meets the requirements under the 
statute to obtain protection. Trolling practices must be eradicated and 
should be condemned, but not at the expense of the copyright holders’ 
rights or the potentially harmful manipulation of FRCP 20. 
6. Safeguards Against Trolling 
Case law in BitTorrent cases suggests that a lot of courts have 
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approached these issues with a black and white lens. The court either 
allows the plaintiff to join the defendants or, for all intents and purposes, 
ends the lawsuit by forcing the plaintiff to spend significantly higher 
costs to recover for damages. This Article suggests that the approach 
should be more nuanced. The proper use of FRCP 20 can either allow or 
deny the use of swarm joinder, depending on the plaintiff’s motive for 
filing the claims and the plaintiff’s careful selection of the right 
defendants and the right jurisdiction. The courts also have FRCP 21 to 
exercise their discretion, using their better—but unbiased—judgment 
and applying the Rules to the facts in front of them, instead of trying to 
use cookie cutter solutions. 
Courts can require plaintiffs to use selective criteria for the 
defendants they wish to sue. These filters would narrow the number of 
defendants and bring it down to a reasonable and manageable amount, 
finding a happy medium between trying to sue hundreds of defendants 
and having to sue each one individually. Courts can even go as far as 
limiting the actual number of defendants that can be joined in each case. 
If, for instance, a court states that a BitTorrent plaintiff may only seek to 
join 15 defendants in any given claim, an additional burden will be 
placed on the plaintiff that wants to sue 30 defendants. However, even if 
the plaintiff has to split the claim in two separate claims of 15 
defendants each, this is still preferable over having to file 30 individual 
lawsuits. 
If a plaintiff is able to prove that the defendant was carefully selected, 
the court can then allow the plaintiff to draft a settlement offer that is 
supervised by the court. Preventing the direct communication between 
the plaintiff and the defendant can minimize the risk of coercion and 
undue influence. Courts can even go as far as asking each defendant to 
bring the letter they received to make sure that the plaintiff did not show 
the court one letter and sent the defendant a different one. The court 
could additionally restrict the plaintiff’s communication with the 
defendant in regards to a particular claim in the event that the plaintiff 
were to attempt to drop the defendant to avoid the supervision of the 
court after obtaining the defendant’s identifying information.  
A commentator suggests the use of magistrates or special masters to 
help in the initial determination of whether the claims are brought in 
good faith, issuing then a recommendation for the judge that can 
promote judicial efficiency.188 This suggestion, coupled with selective 
criteria that results in fewer defendants joined, can promote the policy 
behind FRCP 20 and mitigate many of the risks that critics bring up. 
Additional criteria can be added to the interpretation of FRCP 20, in 
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the same way that the “fundamental fairness” factors were added. One 
criterion may include geographic relationship, which can preemptively 
prevent jurisdictional issues. A geographic relationship requirement 
would ensure that the plaintiff is trying to join defendants upon which 
the court has proper jurisdiction, and not just threaten as many 
defendants as possible with litigation to coerce settlements. Another 
criterion may be time proximity. This criterion would ensure that 
plaintiffs are truly searching for a nexus between the defendants they are 
trying to join. Although plaintiffs are already grouping defendants that 
interact over shorter periods of time, courts could require this nexus to 
be tighter to ensure that the proper defendants are joined. 
Lastly, in addition to granting legal fees to the defendants as provided 
for in 17 U.S.C. § 505, the courts can also add penalties for plaintiffs 
who do not follow these additional criteria or plaintiffs who repeatedly 
engage in trolling practices. 
7. Denial of Swarm Joinder Will Not Prevent Trolling 
An absolute denial of swarm joinder does more harm than good, 
because it provides pirates with a sense of security and encouragement 
to continue their illegal practices, while at the same time undervaluing 
the constitutionally given protection of the copyright holders.  
What is even more telling of the inadequacy of using the denial of 
swarm joinder as a means to address trolls, is the fact that Malibu 
Media,189 one of the most active plaintiffs in copyright infringement, has 
abandoned the use of swarm joinder in its lawsuits since 2013.190 
Instead, Malibu Media has been filing individual lawsuits—nearly 2,000 
in a span of a year and a half191—and asking for higher settlement 
amounts to justify its filing costs. The fact that Malibu Media has been 
found able to modify its tactic to no longer be affected by the courts’ 
aversion to swarm joinder is powerful evidence of two things: (1) a troll 
will always find a way to be a troll, and (2) swarm joinder is not the 
cause of the problem, and thus, denying it is not the solution. 
 
 189. See Gabe Friedman, The Biggest Filer of Copyright Lawsuits? This Erotica Web Site, THE 
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founded by Colette Pelisier Field and Brigham Field).  
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CONCLUSION 
Swarm joinder may not be the perfect solution to the piracy problem. 
However, it can be one that achieves the most efficient results in 
deterring the uncontrollable increase in copyright infringement, at least 
until the legislature and the courts are able to provide copyright holders 
with a more suitable recourse. Similarly, the suggestions made in this 
Article are far from ideal, but the slight probability of inconveniencing 
innocent defendants on a case by case basis is far less detrimental than 
hardening the interpretation of the FRCP resulting in an exception that 
does not cure the illness but only treats the symptoms, and does it 
poorly.  
The BT Protocol and its lawful uses are a reminder of the direction in 
which technology is headed. Manipulating the FRCP solely to get rid of 
an incidental result of the advance of technology will not provide a long-
term solution, and will only get tougher as technology progresses. With 
the advance of technology, suing individual defendants with limited 
financial resources is not a viable option for copyright holders to recover 
for their damages. If copyright holders are not going to be able to protect 
their work from illegal use, the entire purpose behind the Constitution’s 
Copyright Clause, to secure original work and “promote the progress of 
science and useful arts” is undermined because, without protection, 
there is no longer value in creating new and better work. The curtailing 
of the already limited means that copyright holders have to enforce their 
constitutionally given protection is not the solution to either the piracy 
or trolling problems. 
It may very well be true that the high caliber of shows, such as the 
Game of Thrones series, is precisely a strong pull factor that attracts 
pirates who wish to enjoy these shows without having to pay the 
subscription fees to watch them. This tempting factor in no way justifies 
partaking in piracy practices, and until the legislature is able to enact 
laws that better protect copyright holders and innocent defendants, it is 
up to the courts to ensure justice is carried. However, the undue 
manipulation of FRCP 20 presents more problems than solutions and 
erodes the explicit flexibility and efficiency purpose behind the Rule. 
The denial of swarm joinder, allowing pirates to enjoy unencumbered 
illegal access to protected works at the expense of the rights of copyright 
holders and the integrity of the FRCP, is not only to witness the tail wag 
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